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When Guam received its Organic Act in 1950, after half a
century of US naval occupation, it was not a benevolent gift from
a generous colonizer nor a prize awarded to the Chamorro people
for their loyalty throughout a brutal wartime experience.
Rather, its long-overdue passage in an era of decolonization is
attributable to various factors, including a half-century of
Chamorro resistance climaxing with a walkout by the Guam Congress
in 1949. The walkout generated intense national publicity, and
friends of Guam residing in the United States stepped up their
lobbying efforts, using the walkout to illustrate graphically
Chamorro dissatisfaction with US naval rule.
In a recent interview, former member of the Guam Congress,
Carlos Taitano disclosed, "We knew something had to happen. We
had to tell the American public. Martial law was really horrible
and we had to create an incident which would bring publicity to
Guam" (Carlos Taitano, personal communication, November 29,
1993). Taitano revealed that several months prior to the
Assembly walkout, two news correspondents - one representing the
Associated Press and the other the United Press - visited Guam to
report on military affairs. He entertained them at his home in
Mangilao and narrated to them a brief history of Guam under the
oppressive naval government. Taitano and the newsmen agreed that
if the Chamorro people's desire for self-government was to be
heard, an incident of substantial magnitude must occur, great
enough to warrant major coverage in the newspapers. Taitano
agreed that should such an incident unfold, he would personally
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inform the two reporters by radiogram.
Details of the congress' walkout were reported in newspapers
throughout the United States. A few of the 1949 headlines read:
The New York Times, March 6, 1949: Guam Assembly Quits:
Protests What It Calls a Navy Move to Limit its Power
Washington Post, March 6, 1949: Navy Action Protested
by Guam Assembly
Honolulu Star-Bulletin, March 29, 1949: Guam's Boston
Tea Party
Washington Post, April 3, 1949: Guam Rebels at New Navy
'Rule'
Despite the publicity generated by the 1949 Guam
Congress walkout, authors of Guam history have paid
scant attention to the protest. Charles Beardsley
(1964), Earl Pomeroy (1951) and Frederick Weber (1970)
completely disregard it in their studies, while others
devote thin paragraphs to the incident. Michael Dean
Zenor (1949, p. 79) remarks that the Congressmen acted
"hastily" and reduces the walkout to an act of
"political immaturity." Richard Roy Griffith (1978, p.
171) removes responsibility from members of the Guam
Congress, remarking that lithe Attorney General
apparently had encouraged the lower house to take such
action. II He adds that the Chamorro public attended
village meetings where they "vehemently expressed
satisfaction with their ousted elected representatives II
2
(p. 174). In a one-paragraph summary of the walkout,
Paul Carano and Pedro Sanchez (1964, p. 348) refer to
it as "an unpleasant incident ... which resulted in
increased agitation for transferring Guam to the
control of a civilian department of the federal
government and for the passage of an organic act." In
Sanchez's later, independent work (1988, p. 299), he
maintains that walkout occurred because members of the
Guam Congress IIfelt betrayed by the Governor. II
House of Assembly Speaker Antonio B. Won Pat
emphasized, lithe Assembly action was not based upon any
single incident, but upon a series of actions " (IIMr.
Won Pat ... ," p. 1). Written accounts, however, have
focused primarily on one incident, the vetoed subpoena
bill of the House of Assembly, as the cause of the
walkout. A closer examination of the issues and events
leading up to the walkout exposes a battery of
unresolved issues, each one of which added to the
frustration of disempowered legislators. From the
beginning of US rule in 1899, and intensifying after
World War II, the Chamorro people suffered through land
alienation, civil rights violations, discrimination,
arbitrary naval rule, and the lack of self-government.
In its articulation of political inadequacies, the
walkout became a significant episode in the movement
for U.S. citizenship by the Chamorros of Guam,
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climaxing with the Organic Act of 1950.
What were the issues driving the Guam Congress'
1949 act of defiance? What are the "series of
actions" referred to by Speaker Won Pat? What does the
walkout reveal about Chamorro views and understandings
of US citizenship? An examination of the 9th Guam
Congress proceedings provides a glimpse into the
political and social circumstances culminating with the
March 5 walkout.
INTRODUCTION TO U.S. COLONIALISM
Thirteen months after the United States seized
Guam from Spain, the first appointed governor arrived,
on August 10, 1899. Accompanied by US marine and navy
troops, Captain Richard Leary proclaimed the
occupation of Guam, the southernmost Mariana Island.
In one of the few written accounts of Chamorro response
from this period, visiting Brigadier General Joseph
Wheeler (1900, p. 16) commented that the indigenous
people "seemed very desirous of establishing the
kindest relations with the Americans, and ... they
hoped for and expected great advantages to come to the
island from American rule." Indeed, from village to
village, Wheeler and other visiting Americans were
greeted in typically generous and hospitable Chamorro
style.
Governor Leary established a system and style of
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government that served as the model for later Naval
governors in their domination of the Chamorro people;
in the governor was vested all executive, legislative,
and judicial power. Only 2 weeks after his arrival,
Leary banned public celebrations of patron saints'
feast days, fiestas that remain significant occasions
of celebration on Guam. Leary also enacted an order
banning the ringing of church bells before 8:00 in the
morning. Wheeler's 1900 report revealed Chamorro
displeasure with executive orders pertaining to
religion: "orders with regard to religion are evidently
considered as a hardship and are distasteful to the
majority of the people" (Wheeler, p. 36).
The autocratic rule of naval governors was a
continual source of frustration to the indigenous
people of Guam. In a 1901 petition to the u.s.
Congress, Chamorro leaders criticized, "It is not an
exaggeration to say that fewer permanent guarantees of
liberty and property rights exist now than when under
Spanish domination" (1901 Petition to the United States
Congress) .
EXPRESSIONS OF RESISTANCE
A petition in 1901 declared loyalty to the United
States, saying that" [t]he change of sovereignty was
welcomed by the inhabitants of Guam," but that, II [a]
military government at best is distasteful and highly
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repugnant to the fundamental principles of civilized
government II (1901 Petition to the United States
Congress) Drafted by a group of 32 Chamorros residing
in Agana, the petition asked that the Congress
establish a IIpermanent government ll on Guam, reflecting
their understanding that the naval administration was
only a temporary form of government.
In a 1933 petition signed by 1,965 natives of
Guam, petitioners again professed their loyalty to the
United States and asserted their aspirations for
citizenship while also reminding the members of
Congress of their responsibility under the Treaty of
Paris to determine the political status of the Chamorro
people. The petition criticized that "the Virgin
Islands, although a later acquisition having been
purchased from the Danish Government on January 25,
1917, have had full American citizenship granted on the
natives on February 25, 1927" (1933 Petition to the
United States Congress) .
Other petitions to the U.S. Congress surfaced in
1917, 1925, 1929, 1936, 1947, 1949, and 1950, but
efforts were consistently thwarted by U.S. naval
opposition to citizenship and civil rights for the
Chamorro people. Some of the petitions seemed to have
gotten "lost" in the files, and were never responded
to, but others were rejected outright for a variety of
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reasons. In 1918, Governor Roy Smith explained to the
petitioning Guam Congress members, liThe present time is
probably not opportune to bring it up again, when [the
U.S.] Congress is so fully occupied with great and
momentous matters affecting the very life of the
nation" (Bordallo, p. 85). The Depression, regional
tensions due to Japan's ominous presence in Micronesia,
and both the First and Second World Wars were used as
excuses for ignoring the political concerns of the
Chamorro people.
Governor Roy Smith created an appointed advisory
Guam Congress in 1917. According to anthropologist
Laura Thompson, the Guam Congress was created II [m]ainly
as a result of native dissatisfaction at the loss of
their political privileges" (Thompson, 1944, p. 149).
Its members were appointed by the governor, and were to
act in a merely advisory capacity. Despite their
inability to enact laws or policies, the Chamorro
legislators used this opportunity to criticize the
naval government and to discuss questions of civil
rights and citizenship.
The members of the Guam Congress also hosted
visiting American dignitaries and used those
opportunities to relay their wishes. Despite
supportive and encouraging messages from nearly every
visiting US congress member or cabinet-level visitor,
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numerous bills introduced in the U.S. Congress failed
to gain passage. Because of this history of failed
legislation, Chamorro political leaders decided that
direct contact with Washington, DC legislators would be
necessary to further the citizenship drive.
In July 1936, 8 months after a tour of Guam by
Secretary of War George H. Dorn, the Guam Congress
selected two of its members, Baltasar J. Bordallo and
Francisco B. Leon Guerrero, to travel to Washington, DC
and lobby in the U.S. Congress and in the capital on
behalf of the Chamorro people. After the naval
governor of Guam refused financial assistance for the
trip, colleagues in the Guam Congress began a fund-
raising drive. Jeff Tainatongo Barcinas of Merizo,
whose father Jose was a Council member in the 5th
through 10th Guam Congresses, recalled stories shared
by his father about these hopeful fund-raising efforts.
Jeff reminisced:
F.Q. Sanchez was in the House of Council, and
Jesus Quinata, also from Umatac, was in the House
of Assembly. The two were able to raise money
with village kids carrying blankets. They'd walk
through the villages with their blankets spread
out across the road and people would throw their
coins or dollars into the blankets .... That was
how they'd go about fundraising. (Jeff T.
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Barcinas, personal communication, October 30,
1993)
The islandwide fund drive for Leon Guerrero and
Bordallo raised over $6,500, capital sufficient for the
trip to Washington, DC. There the two met with
President Franklin Roosevelt and testified before
Congress. Bills conferring citizenship on the
indigenous inhabitants of Guam were introduced in both
the Senate and the House of Representatives; the Navy
however, proved to be a powerful foe. Secretary of the
Navy Claude A. Swanson objected to citizenship for
Chamorros on behalf of the Navy, citing the complicated
international situation in the Far East. Citizenship
for the Chamorros would "aggravate the danger to
peaceful international situations. II Further, Swanson
reasoned, "there is every indication that these people
have not yet reached a state of development
commensurate with the personal independence,
obligations, and responsibilities of United States
citizenship. It is believed that such a change of
status at this time would be most harmful to the native
people ll (Bordallo, p. 130). Both Bordallo and Leon
Guerrero testified in rebuttal to Swanson's assessment,
but the Navy's control over Guam prevailed. Neither
bill was acted upon during that session of Congress,
and both Bordallo and Leon Guerrero would remain
9
prominent figures in Guam's political scene.
DESTRUCTION, DISPOSSESSION AND DISCRIMINATION
Chamorro concerns remained unaddressed by the u.s.
Congress at the time of Japan's attack on Guam on
December 8, 1941. Guam was to be occupied by this
foreign power for nearly 3 years, and the Chamorros
suffered tremendous atrocities at the hands of the
Japanese military. In the last month before u.s.
reoccupation, Chamorros were herded out of their
villages and moved into concentration camps where they
were forced to provide labor and food for the Japanese
military population. Men, women and children worked on
huge agricultural projects and on military construction
projects, such as building airfields, bunkers and gun
emplacements. Executions, beatings, and rapes were
bleak aspects of the war experience that became
embedded in the Chamorro memory.
Unforgettable also was the u.s. campaign to
recapture Guam. When the reoccupation campaign for
Guam's liberation was concluded, the island's villages
were devastated by the effects of American bombardment.
All across Guam, about 80 percent of the island's
homes, buildings and permanent structures were
destroyed (Hale-'ta, p. 109). The capital of Agana,
home to over half the Chamorro population before the
war, was almost completely destroyed by the
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bombardment; by 1950, the 'population of Agana had
decreased from its prewar peak of over 10,000 to only
760 residents (Sanchez, p. 268). Sumay, the second
largest village with a population of over 1,900 prior
to the war, was completely condemned for use by the
military (Sanchez, p. 269).
Over 200,000 military personnel were stationed on
Guam for the remaining battles of the war. Within 1
year, 21 military bases were constructed on Guam
(Underwood, 1987, pp. 93-5). By 1946, only 7 miles2 ,
about one-third of Guam's land, remained in native
ownership (Thompson, 1947, p. 125). By 1947, 1,350
families had lost their land and homes due to military
policy (Maga, 1988, p. 197). Adding insult to injury,
Chamorros involved in the mammoth military construction
projects complained bitterly of a discriminatory IINavy-
decreed pay rate of less than one-fourth the pay rate
[of stateside hires] . .. for identical skills in
identical jobs ll (Collier, p. 2). Ironically, even
Chamorros enlisting into the service of the U.S.
military faced discrimination; Chamorro men entering
the Navy were allowed admission only as Mess
Attendants, regardless of educational background.
Although issues such as discriminatory practices
and unsatisfied political desires for U.S. citizenship
and civil government plagued Chamorros, military land
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grabbing was the critical concern of the postwar
Chamorro population. The appropriation of land by the
military touched Chamorro lives unlike any other
imposition of the US government. The military wanted
bases in order to complete their war effort, and lands
were taken without regard for the Chamorro land tenure
system. In Agana and Sumay alone, approximately 11,000
of the island's 20,000 inhabitants were displaced
(Sanchez, pp. 159, 268). Though these were the two
villages most sorely hit by military land grabbing
practices, other Chamorros in different areas allover
the island suffered the same fate. To provide shelter
for these thousands of displaced Chamorros, the
military government Public Works Department constructed
small frame dwellings and tent frame structures for
approximately 1,400 families. These were built in the
new or enlarged villages of Dededo, Barrigada,
Sinajana, Yona, Asan, Santa Rita, and Agat
(IIHousing ... , II p. 1).
By 1948, the naval administration was condemning
lands almost exclusively for the recreational use of
military dependents. In Agana, roughly 500 people were
displaced when 82 lots were condemned for a park
(IICondemnation,II p. 3) and in Tamuning, 60 hectares of
Tumon Beach were condemned for a military recreational
center (Guam Congress House of Assembly (GCHA),
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November 4, 1949, pp. 16-7). Chamorros were further
perturbed to see fertile lands seized by the military
sitting idle. In Barrigada, Frank C. Perez reported
that his farmlands, once used for raising livestock,
were lying dormant ("Land Disposition ... ," p. 1). What
also bothered the people was the seemingly arbitrary
nature in which lands were selected. No one's land
and home were beyond the demolition of military
bulldozers. These feelings of insecurity surfaced in
the citizenship debates; in the words of Council member
Francisco Sanchez of Umatac, Chamorros typically
believed" [t]he granting of American citizenship to the
Guamanian people will remove one of the greatest fears
among us, and that is the fear of insecurity .... The
government of the United States ... extends protection
not only to individuals, but also to their property"
("Francisco Sanchez ... ," p. 2).
For his part, Governor Pownall defended the
appropriation of lands for recreational use as an
"essential requirement of the Armed Forces of the
United States in prosecuting the war ll (Pownall, April
26, 1948). Such was the case of beachfront property in
Tumon, requested for recreational use by the commanding
general, Marianas Bonins Command, for the combined air
and ground forces based on Guam. Pownall rationalized
that 11 [t]o provide adequate athletic facilities for the
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personnel of the Armed Forces on Guam is of direct
concern to the local Government in effecting law and
order, harmony and morale" (Pownall, April 26, 1948).
For the most part, Chamorros did not dispute the
need for military bases. With the war experience so
fresh on their minds, Chamorros welcomed bases as a
sign of future protection against foreign invasion.
Yet when the military began condemning lands for parks
and recreational facilities exclusively for military
personnel, resistance to land alienation multiplied.
Sanchez commented, "While they [the Chamorro people]
fully recognized and offered no complaints for land
taken for military use, they did not accept the
position that private land should be held for security
perimeters, recreation and contingencies" (Sanchez, p.
271) .
THE 9TH CONGRESS FIGHTS FOR LAND AND JUSTICE
In a 1946 report to the United Nations detailing
numerous features of American rule in Guam and American
Samoa, the Navy Department described the Land and
Claims Commission as "the real estate agency for the
Governor of Guam" (Assistant Chief of Naval
Operations). In one of its functions, the Land and
Claims Commission determined the terms of compensation
to uprooted Chamorro landowners, restitution that
averaged only 6 percent of the land's appraised value
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(IINavy to Buy Land, II p. 1). Frank Perez testified to
visiting u.s. Congressmen in 1949 that for 160 acres of
his farm upon which the U.S.Naval Hospital was built,
he received $100 per year (IILand Disposition ... ," p.
1). Another landowner reported that his 14 acres on a
most desirable site on Guam were leased to the Navy for
only $14.10 per year (IIGuam Suggestions ... ," p. 1).
Guam Congress members struggled to help their
constituents with these crucial land matters. In an
attempt to understand the power of the naval government
regarding the land condemnation procedures, members of
the Assembly called upon the attorney general for legal
clarification. In the 4th Regular Session of the House
of Council, Attorney General Vivien McConnell confirmed
that lithe government is authorized to condemn lands for
the rehabilitation of Guam" (Guam Congress House of
Council (GCHC), September 11/ 1948/ p. 5); Council
member Bordallo voiced concerns about the rights of
landowners and speculated " s ince lands can not be
condemned unless it is for the benefit of the public,
there may be legal technicalities involved. II McConnell
explained that II [t]here are no legal technicalities
involved at all because the government is authorized to
condemn lands" (GCHC, September 11, 1948, p. 5)
Despite their ostensible powerlessness,
legislators attempted different strategies to alleviate
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the situation. When the army moved to condemn 60
hectares of Tumon Beach in 1948, members of Congress
held conferences with the governor and with the officer
in charge of the Land and Claims Commission. Council
member Bordallo reported to the Guam Congress that the
naval officers (the governor and the Land and Claims
Commission officer) felt that "they didn't have the
power to reduce the area acquired by the Army because
they had a directive from high authorities in
Washington, D.C." (GCHC, September 11, 1948, pp. 2-3).
This prompted a September 11, 1948 cablegram to
Secretary of Defense James V. Forrestal from members of
the House of Council. Testimony from the 4th Regular
Session of Council reads:
'TO THE HONORABLE JAMES FORRESTAL
SECRETARY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE
REQUEST KIND RECONSIDERATION OF US ARMY RECREATION
BEACH AT TUMON AREA NOT TO INCLUDE THE HOMES OF
NINE FAMILIES WITH CHILDREN. FAMILIES URGENTLY
REQUEST TO REMAIN IN PRESENT HOMES AND PROPERTIES
INHERITED FROM PARENTS' (GCHC, September 11, 1948,
p. 2).
In debate on the floor of the Council, members
questioned whether it was necessary to seek the
intervention of the secretary of defense. The
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cablegram was agreed upon as a desperate measure,
reflected in the testimony of Council member Simon
Sanchez, who argued that "All of them [evicted
families] have been reared from the soil and this land
was inherited from their parents and these people have
a strong sentiment for the soil. It is my belief that
this is our last appeal and whether he will consider it
favorably or not, it is worth trying" (GCHC, September
11, 1948, p. 3). It nonetheless failed to save the
Tumon land from military bulldozers.
Another congressional tactic intended to alleviate
the land crisis was legislation to abolish the Superior
Court. Prior to World War II, land cases were heard in
the Island Court and appeals of those decisions went to
the Court of Appeals on Guam. Following the war, an
important element in the court system changed with the
creation of the Superior Court of Guam. The Superior
Court was given jurisdiction over all civil cases in
which the naval government or the United States of
America was a party, which included jurisdiction over
land condemnation cases. Under this new court system,
Chamorros dissatisfied with compensation terms set by
the Land and Claims Commission were directed to take
their case to the Superior Court, whose judge was
appointed by the Secretary of the Navy. Appeals of
Superior Court decisions were sent to the secretary for
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final deliberation. In the Congressmen's view, the
Land and Claims Commission, the Superior Court, and the
appeal process to the secretary of the Navy blatantly
favored military interests and effectively prohibited
Chamorros from formally contesting the decisions of the
Land and Claims Commission. In the House of Assembly's
December 11, 1948 session, Judiciary Committee member
Joaquin C. Perez stated:
The Secretary of the Navy maintains his office,
shall we say, nine thousand miles away, and it is
very obvious that a party desiring to appeal
cannot economically be present at a hearing .... A
man is entitled to present his case in the best
possible manner. A man is entitled to present his
case face-to-face. Robbing a man of that
privilege is certainly robbing him of a portion of
the justice due him (GCHA, December 11, 1948, p.
A7) .
Council member Perez interviewed Island Court judges
who conceded that the Island Court was willing to and
capable of handling the Superior Court caseload (GCHA,
December 11, 1948, p. A15). Congressional legislation
to abolish the Superior Court was vetoed on January 3,
1949 by Governor Pownall who stated in a letter to the
Guam Congress that "the Superior Court fulfills a
definite need in the judicial structure for Guam ....
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There is a large volume of land cases requiring the
attention of the Superior Court" (Pownall, 1949). The
controversial appeal process to the secretary of the
Navy was not repealed until the administration of Guam
was transferred to the Department of Interior in 1950.
In a memorandum to the Guam Congress, Governor
Pownall chastised members of the Congress for meddling
in land affairs, saying Iia mistaken idea exists in the
minds of some of the members of the Guam Congress, with
respect to land condemnation" (Pownall, July 20, 1948).
Pownall wrote:
The Governor appreciates the interest of the Guam
'Congress in such matters but believes that the
proper solution of matters of this nature should
be left to the determination of that branch of
government charged with the responsibility of
hearing and determining rights of individuals
under law (Pownall, July 20, 1948).
THE NON-LEGISLATIVE LEGISLATURE
The first postwar election for the Guam Congress
took place on July 13, 1946. Following the induction
of the first postwar Congress, Guam's new naval
governor, Admiral Charles Pownall, spoke encouragingly
of increased self-government for Chamorros. Pownall,
in a May 27, 1947 letter to the Chief of Naval
Operations, wrote that "a great deal of the current
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unrest among the peoples of Guam has been the fact that
the Governor's power is plenary and that the Guam
Congress is merely an advisory bodyll (Zenor, p. 62)
Indeed, Chamorro leaders were excited by the 1947
proclamation of Secretary of the Navy John Sullivan
granting limited powers to the Guam Congress. Members
of Congress looked favorably upon this Proclamation as
a step forward; finally, it seemed as if previous
lobbying efforts for self-government were paying off.
Proclamation Granting Limited Powers to Guam
Congress
Whereas the citizens of the Island of Guam,
through the Guam Congress, have expressed a desire
for American citizenship and an organic act for
that island with self-government; and
Whereas the United States Government reposes
faith, trust, and confidence in the people of Guam
and desires to give to them a greater share in
their own Government;
Now, therefore, by virtue of the authority vested
in the Secretary of the Navy by Executive Order
108-A dated 23 December 1898, it is hereby
proclaimed:
No change or changes shall be made in nor new
provision or provisions added to the Penal Code of
Guam, Civil Code of Guam, Code of Civil Procedure,
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Probate Code, the Civil Regulations With the Force
and Effect of Law in Guam, except as in the
manner hereinafter provided.
Such changes or additions may be proposed by a
majority vote in both Houses of the Guam Congress.
Such proposals shall be conveyed in writing to the
Governor of Guam by the chairman of each House of
the Guam Congress, and the proposals shall be
signed by the chairman certifying the necessary
vote (Sullivan, 1947).
This proclamation was met with great enthusiasm and
excitement among Chamorro leaders, but by 1948 Guam
Congress members began realizing the inadequacies of
the proclamation. At the request of the House of
Council, Attorney General McConnell attended the 3rd
Regular Session on September 4, 1948 to provide legal
clarification on the terms of the proclamation.
Governor Pownall had earlier forwarded a proposed bill
to the Council for their enactment, and Council members
wondered what would happen if such a bill were ignored
or if passage failed. McConnell replied that "a bill
... has to be introduced by a member of Congress." The
attorney general added, however, that even without the
consent of Congress, the governor could issue an
executive order, having the effect of law, until the
Guam Congress took favorable action. If the Guam
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Congress took unfavorable action, the order would go to
the secretary of the Navy for a final decision. In the
meantime, it would remain law unless disapproved by the
secretary of the Navy (GCHC, September 4, 1948, p. 5).
In practice, Pownall maintained the same posture
as had previous governors, despite assuring Congress
members of their legislative powers. AssemblYman
Taitano summed up a common feeling among Guam
legislators when he said:
I came into this House of Assembly last June
[1948] with high hopes. I had read the
Proclamation granting this Congress legislative
powers .... after seven months as an Assemblyman, I
have discovered that we haven't got those
powers .... I can't see that this Congress is
anything more than an advisory body (GCHA, March
5, 1949, pp. 6 - 7) .
Perhaps in this new era of Cold War politics,
Governor Pownall worried excessively about the
potential political resistance of Chamorros, as
cautioned in a 1942 Office of Strategic Services (aSS)
report (Maga, 1988, p. 176) to the president regarding
a postwar government on Guam. Maga's review of the
previously top secret report uncovers ass admonitions
of radicalism among Chamorros in the Guam Congress.
The ass characterized the Guam Congress as an
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"uncooperative component of the navy's 'democratic
machinery.' The report further recommended that "post-
liberation rewards to the Guamanians should be limited
to honorary functions and colorful statements, for
greater political authority might lead to radical
policies and threats to America's strategic position in
the western Pacific" (Maga, 1988, pp. 176-7).
HELP FROM ABROAD
Despite local Navy opposition to political reform
on Guam, the island's political interests were promoted
on the U.S. mainland by the independent lobbying and
publicity efforts of friends of Guam such as the
Washington, DC-based Institute of Ethnic Affairs,
anthropologist and Chamorro rights advocate Laura
Thompson in conjunction with the American Civil
Liberties Union (ACLU), and New York attorney Richard
Wels. Studies by presidential and naval committees
rendered their recommendations to the nation's
political leaders. These studies voiced support for
citizenship and a civilian form of government for Guam.
The Institute of Ethnic Affairs was created by
Laura Thompson and other civil rights activists in
Washington, DC to help the people of Guam remedy their
political situation (Thompson, 1991, p. 85). John
Collier, president of the Institute of Ethnic Affairs
(who was also a former U.S. commissioner of Indian
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Affairs and the husband of Laura Thompson), worked
closely with the Guam Congress in transmitting the
political desires of the Chamorro people to a wider, US
mainland audience. This was undertaken primarily
through publication of the Guam Echo, a newsletter that
detailed both local and national political developments
regarding the U.S. colonies. Members of the Guam
Congress specifically transmitted parts of their
congressional proceedings to the staff of the Guam Echo
for their information and dissemination. In addition
to utilizing the Guam Echo for publicity purposes,
members of the Institute touted the Guam cause by
writing articles for various magazines and newspapers,
delivering lectures, and holding conferences (Thompson,
19 91, pp. 85 - 6) .
Laura Thompson's involvement in Guam affairs
followed her employment in 1938 as Consultant on Native
Affairs to the naval governor of Guam, and, by the
outbreak of World War II, this fieldwork experience had
already spawned several monographs, articles and books
on the archaeology, culture, and life of the Marianas.
Following her critical disclosure of naval practices on
Guam, she was barred by the Navy from returning to the
island. Through her writings and ,public appearances,
Thompson generated support for the Chamorro political
cause. Employing her personal knowledge of the Guam
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situation, Thompson was an occasional guest of Richard
Wels on his radio program, the "Court of Current
Issues," in New York on ABC network (Wels, R. to R.
Underwood, June 8, 1982). Testifying before the U.S.
House of Representatives, she represented the ACLU in
hearings regarding Guam before the Committee on Public
Lands, and referred to the naval government of Guam as
a "rapidly rotating personal dictatorship'! (Thompson,
1983, p. 6A) The ACLU strongly recommended
citizenship, an organic act, and civil government for
the island of Guam.
Attorney Richard Wels became an advocate of
political rights for the Chamorro people following his
return to the U.S. mainland in 1946, subsequent to
active duty in the U.S. Naval Reserve, in which he
served 16 months on Guam as a U.S. attorney during the
war crimes trials. Wels began a letter writing
campaign to The New York Times, reporting of the
Chamorro people's inadequate political situation. In
correspondence with Chamorro historian Robert
Underwood, Wels recalled attending a meeting called by
Editor Foster Hailey of Time magazine with Gilbert
Cant, another Time magazine editor; author Pearl Buck;
and Buck's husband Richard Walsh, publisher and editor
of Asia magazine, in which they discussed ways of using
their connections to publicize the plight of the
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Chamorro people under u.s. Navy rule (Wels, R. to R.
Underwood, January 31, 1977 and March 28, 1977). As
Wels recollected:
The New York Times was generous with its help, and
there was scarcely a week in which it did not
publish several letters on Guam, many of which I
wrote. Time Magazine, CBS radio, and many other
papers and magazines, were also won over and lend
their support. Joseph Farrington, the Delegate to
Congress from Hawaii, also worked closely with us
and was most helpful. Asia also ran several
articles of which I wrote two (Wels, R. to R.
Underwood, March 9, 1977).
President Truman responded to the postwar
clamoring of territorial supporters by appointing a
committee of the Secretaries of State, War, Navy, and
Interior to study the status of the Pacific territories
(Guam, Samoa, and the numerous Micronesian islands
administered as the Trust Territory of the Pacific
Islands). Regarding Guam, Truman's committee
recommended on 18 June 1947 that organic legislation be
enacted providing a civil government, American
citizenship, legislative powers, and a bill of rights
for Guam; the committee, however, also recommended that
the Navy Department continue to administer Guam until
the island's transfer to the jurisdiction of a civilian
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agency of the government (Bordallo, pp. 160-1).
Navy Secretary James V. Forrestal in 1947
appointed a team of civilians to study charges of Navy
mishandling of government duties in Guam and American
Samoa. The report of the committee members, Chairman
Ernest Hopkins, Maurice Tobin, and Knowles Ryerson,
corroborated Chamorro allegations of excessive land
alienation abuse, inordinate wage discrimination, and
arbitrary practices of naval officers. The Hopkins
committee recommended citizenship, organic acts, and a
civilian form of government for both U.S. colonies, but
also recommended continuation of naval control for an
indefinite time period (Collier, 1947; Hopkins, Tobin,
& Ryerson, 1947).
THE SUBPOENA ISSUE
Despite the significance of various committee
studies and lobbying efforts in the United States,
members of the Guam Congress still faced the daily
paradoxical struggles of a legislative body under
military rule. From the earliest sessions of the 9th
Guam Congress in 1948, both Council and Assembly
members questioned the limited legislative powers
supposedly granted them in the 1947 proclamation. In
only the second session of the House of Assembly,
Congress members questioned whether they enjoyed the
"inherent subpoena powers and power to administer
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oaths" held by legislative bodies (GCHA, August 14,
1948, p. 9).
In order to resolve Congressmen's uncertainties
about the extent of their limited legislative powers,
Assembly member Leon Flores introduced a bill to grant
subpoena powers to the Guam Congress. In the proposed
bill's wording, the penalty for disobedience of a
subpoena would be punishable as contempt of the Guam
Congress, subject to imprisonment for a term of between
5 and 30 days (GCHA, August 14, 1948, p. 9). This bill
was vetoed by Governor Pownall on October 1, 1948,
because, according to Pownall, the Guam Congress'
legislative powers already allowed them to conduct and
authorize investigations (GCHA, October 2, 1948, p. 3)
Pownall assured the Congress that legislative bodies
possessed certain inherent powers, but he failed to
specifically address the issue of subpoena powers.
Still uncertain about the scope of their "inherent
powers, II the House of Assembly sent the rejected
subpoena bill back to its Judiciary Committee for
further study.
In the next session of Congress, on October 9,
1948, only 8 days after Pownall's veto of the subpoena
bill, Speaker Won Pat reported the results of a meeting
with Pownall in which they discussed the Congress'
legislative powers. Council member Ismael Calvo of
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Sinajana began the discussion by directly asking the
Speaker, "Is the Guam Congress still an advisory body,
or do we have any legislative powers?" (GCHA, October
9, 1948, p. 4). Won Pat referred to the 1947
proclamation's declaration of "limited legislative
powers", and reported that, according to Pownall, the
Congress has "implied subpoena powers over the
residents of the island" (GCHA, Oct. 9, 1948, p. 5).
Speaker Won Pat's answers failed to assuage the doubts
of skeptical Congress members; Calvo replied, "we are
only a puppet Congress. There is no use wasting my
time here if I am not to represent my people" (GCHA,
Oct. 9, 1948, p. 5).
The vetoed "Bill on Subpoena Power," which had
been returned to the Judiciary Committee for further
investigation, was resubmitted to the floor of the
House of Assembly on January 8, 1949. Judiciary
Committee members Enrique Untalan, Joaquin C. Perez,
Vicente Bamba, Leon Flores, and Jose Leon Guerrero
presented a report that determined that, according to
their evaluations and the reports and opinions of the
attorney general of Guam, the Congress and its
committees had the power to enforce subpoenas; they
therefore recommended dropping the issue. Assembly
member Leon Guerrero, however, added, III wish to ask
all committee chairmen to use the implied powers of
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Congress to subpoena such persons as they may deem
necessary for investigations conducted on any matters
referred to them. That would be the only way this
Congress can find out the extent of our powers ll (GCHA,
January 8, 1949, p. 12).
Jesus Okiyama, Chair of the Commerce and Trade
Committee, was the first committee chair to take up
Leon Guerrero's challenge. His committee was immersed
in a study of violations of the postwar naval
administration economic policy that mandated that
business licenses on Guam could be attained only by
Guamanians, or permanent residents and persons
domiciled on Guam for at least 10 years. This policy
was implemented by Governor Pownall to protect the
indigenous people from outside exploitation during the
postwar economic rehabilitation period; the policy also
intended to prohibit outside business interests from
competing against native enterprises. Okiyama's
committee was II c onducting an extensive investigation
relative to violations of the existing policy of the
Naval Government. The formal investigation will be
conducted on Thursday, January 20th, by subpoenaing
several witnesses accused of violations of this policyll
(GCHA, January 15, 1949, pp. 9-11).
Abe Goldstein, a Navy clerk who operated the Guam
Style Center, a woman's clothing shop, was the first to
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be subpoenaed by Okiyama's committee. Congress members
questioned Goldstein, who refused to answer questions;
he replied to Okiyama and other committee members, "I
hereby respectfully question the authority and
jurisdiction of this committee and of the Guam Congress
to inquire into that matter" (GCHA, February 5, 1949,
p. 4).
Intense discussion followed Goldstein's refusal to
testify in their 5 February 1949 session. Assembly
member Leon Guerrero asserted, "I believe it is time
for us to have the real test as to whether this
Congress has the power to subpoena a witness in
connection with the administration of our Island laws"
(GCHA, February 5, 1949, p. 7). Member of Assembly
Taitano commented:
If we suspect any violation-on the Island of Guam,
on mere suspicion, it can be investigated. I
think this is very important because it is
actually putting to a test this inherent power
which we have, according to the Administration ....
We are in a peculiar situation. We are being
governed by the Navy and this interim power the
Navy has given us is shaky (GCHA, February 5,
1949, p. 6).
Nine days after Goldstein's refusal to testify,
the House of Assembly issued a warrant of arrest for
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contempt of Congress. Joaquin C. Perez assured his
colleagues, "I, on my own, consulted the Attorney
General regarding our intended move. The Attorney
General is of the same opinion that such an individual
is guilty of contempt" (GCHA, February 5, 1949, p. 8).
Pownall, however, ignored the warrant and the Goldstein
issue went unresolved. One week later, Assembly
members debated their options, and opinions to dissolve
the Congress were expressed. Okiyama addressed his
colleagues, "If that warrant of arrest is not honored
and Goldstein is made immune to the laws of Guam,
gentlemen, we might as well dissolve this Guam
Congress" (GCHA, February 12, 1949, p. 9). Frank Perez
added, "If it is within our jurisdiction to handle this
matter, well and good. If not, we might as well fold
up the Guam Congress and go home - we have failed our
people. We want courtesy" (GCHA, February 12, 1949, p.
10). The Assembly members voted that Speaker Won Pat
should discuss the matter personally with Governor
Pownall.
Won Pat met with Pownall, and reported to the
Assembly that "the Guam Congress has no grounds
whatsoever to act, although there are implied powers
inherent" (GCHA, March 5, 1949, p. 5). Because
Goldstein was a Navy employee, the governor believed
that the Guam Congress did not have jurisdiction over
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his actions. Rather, Pownall said, this was a case for
the executive branch of government. Pownall's response
did nothing to clarify the powers of the Guam Congress
and the Assembly members responded in unison.
On the floor of the Assembly, Congress members
responded:
Frank D. Perez: I am of the honest opinion that
it would be best for us to adjourn until such time
when we can do some good for Guam and our people
and the government .... Let us not hide behind
doors, but let us come right out and tell our
people that we cannot do things they wish, because
we have somebody to tell us what to do. I don't
know about the other members but I am of the
opinion that it is time to adjourn until we can be
of service to our Guam people and to the
government.
Carlos P. Taitano: I think the gist of the whole
thing was this. We had been given to believe that
we had certain powers and we went ahead and put it
to a test. We found that we haven't got those
powers .... The embarrassing thing about this,
which I pointed out at the Council Meeting, is
that in the beginning, the Executive Branch
encouraged the members of the Commerce and Trade
Committee to continue on with their investigation
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and then, at the crucial moment, when we decided
to issue a Warrant of Arrest, the Attorney General
gave us his blessings. Then, everything was
stopped short and we are left hanging out on a
limb. The Executive Branch pulled away and left
us dangling. I can't see that this Congress is
anything more than an advisory body.
Concepcion Barrett: How can one man be the
supreme Executive, Legislative, and Judicial
Power? What kind of government is that? (GCHA,
March 5, 1949, pp. 6-10)
Before adjourning from their March 5, 1949
session, members of the Assembly voted unanimously on
liThe Bill to Provide an Organic Act and Civil
Government for the Island of Guam ll (GCHA, March 5,
1949, p. 11) to be transmitted to the US Congress. In
passing their own version of an organic act for Guam,
the members of the Guam Congress sought to identify
clearly the walkout as a call for u.s. citizenship and
civil government rather than as a rejection of the
American presence. Following its passage, Antonio C.
Cruz introduced the walkout motion:
I move that the House of Assembly adjourn at this
time and not to reconvene until such time as this
body receives a reply or the action of the
Congress of the United States relative to the
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Organic Act for Guam as passed by both Houses of
the Guam Congress. (GCHA, March 5, 1949, p. 14)
Cruz's motion passed unanimously, beginning the
walkout.
One week later, on March 12, 1949, protesting
Assembly members were conspicuously absent from a
Special Joint Session of Congress convened by Governor
Pownall to discuss the walkout. Pownall addressed the
Councilmen, and expressed his dismay over the
Assembly's adjournment. Pownall remarked:
I know of no instance in which it can be said that
the Governor has restrained the legislative
authority of this Congress except by lawful
exercise of the veto power .... I express the hope
that there is now a clear understanding of the
legislative powers and responsibilities of this
Congress (GCHC, March 12, 1949, pp. 6~8).
Following Pownall's address, Council member Francisco
B. Leon Guerrero commented:
... [A]n unusual occasion has recently occurred
which could have very well been avoided if our
island and people had received the attention of
the Congress of the United States. I am citing
basic principles and facts. We are now in the
second half century period since the signing of
that treaty that has caused the transfer of the
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Island of Guam from the sovereignty of Spain to
that of the United States .... the fact remains
that without organic legislation there is no
security for ourselves and our posterity (GCHC,
March 12, 1949, p. 8).
Following a lengthy debate that raised issues similar
to those the Assembly had itself raised prior to
adjourning, the Council members voted to recess until
resolution of the Assembly walkout.
WALKOUT REVITALIZES CITIZENSHIP DRIVE
Whether or not Pownall understood that the walkout
was more than a protest of the subpoena issue, it is
clear that to the Chamorro legislators, the subpoena
issue was only a superficial catalyst ln their protest.
Assembly Speaker Won Pat, in a letter to Governor
Pownall, clearly expressed the views of the protesting
Congress members:
It must be emphasized that the Assembly action was
not based upon any single incident, but upon a
series of actions which have occurred with
increasing frequency since the issuance of the
Proclamation of August 4, 1947. Definition of the
scope of its powers has become, in the opinion of
the Assembly, a matter of interpretation of
individual actions of the Congress by the
Executive Branch of the Government without
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observance of any uniform rule. This has created
an atmosphere of uncertainty as a result of which
the Assembly does not feel that it can determine
its mission .. " It is believed that a similar
feeling of uncertainty exists in the minds of the
people concerning the status of the Congress.
The members of the House of Assembly consider that
the powers of the three branches of government
must be defined (IIMr. Won Pat ... , II p. 1).
Assembly member Taitano expressed his belief that the
walkout emerged out of "three major grievances: (1)
Arbitrary rule by the Naval government; (2) Lack of a
constitution guaranteeing civil rights; and (3) Lack of
a court of appeals beyond the Secretary of the Navy"
("Taitano .. . ," p. 13). Taitano's experience of naval
rule on Guam had shown him the discrepancies between
American democracy and arbitrary rule.
The walkout brought the issues of citizenshipt
civil government, and civil rights to a head. When the
Guam legislators ended the walkout and returned to
their positions in the Congress only 1 month later,
their message had already been successfully transmitted
across the United States. National media coverage of
the walkout, coupled with independent lobbying and
publicity efforts by friends of Guam (such as Thompson,
Collier t and Wels) undoubtedly contributed in bringing
37
about political changes on Guam within several months
of the congressional incident.
On May 21, 1949, just over 2 months after the
walkout, President Harry Truman called upon the
secretary of the Department of the Interior to begin
planning immediately for Guam's transfer from the
Department of Navy. The implication of a civilian form
of government was a political development for which
Chamorros had long awaited and for which the great
majority of Guam Congressmen were grateful, despite
hesitation from some Assemblymen who objected to Guam's
relegation to the Department of the Interior.
Concerned members of the Assembly voiced their
apprehension regarding the Interior Department's IIpoor
record in the Virgin Islands and on the American Indian
Reservations ll (Bordallo, p. 222. Also see GCHA, June 4,
1949, pp. 10-12). Despite the expressed reservations,
a congressional resolution recognizing Truman's move to
remove naval rule and requesting Chamorro participation
in the administrative transfer preparations passed by a
majority vote.
One month later, on June 4, 1949, Governor Pownall
announced his retirement, revealing that in his place,
a civilian governor would be appointed (IIGovernor
Pownall ... ,11 p. 1). That civilian would be Carlton
Skinner, and he would work in unison with the Guam
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Congress in seeking citizenship for the Chamorro
people.
CITIZENSHIP SENTIMENTS
After nearly 50 years of lobbying and petitioning
for citizenship, legislators had certain perceptions of
what citizenship would mean for Guam. The events
leading up to the walkout provide interesting insights
into their understandings of citizenship. Some members
of the Guam Congress emphasized the idea that
citizenship would accord the Chamorro people a measure
of equality, thus protecting them from discrimination.
Many Chamorros believed that US citizenship would
remove many of the existing discriminatory practices.
Others viewed citizenship as a means of safeguarding
their land and property; Chamorros believed that the US
government would not arbitrarily condemn the lands of
its own citizens.
In coming to an understanding of the citizenship
movement on Guam, it is impossible to ignore the impact
of the Japanese occupation upon the Chamorros. As
Robert Underwood describes,
The experience left a psychological legacy of fear
of non-American control and helped generate a
relationship of gratitude and debt as far as the
Chamorros were concerned. On the one hand, there
was gratitude for being rescued, but there was
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also a debt owed them by America on whose behalf
they suffered. In keeping with this, the war
experience subsequently became the main rhetorical
basis for the acquisition of u.s. citizenship
(Underwood, 1987, p. 181).
The fears expressed by Underwood compare similarly, if
more intensely, with those expressed in 1926 after the
Philippines House of Representatives passed a
resolution to annex Guam. The idea that Guam's
political status was so ambiguous as to invite
annexation by foreign countries kindled a citizenship
drive at that time as well (Bordallo, pp. 93-97).
The postwar pro-American sentiments of those who
endured various forms of brutalization were expressed
by a great majority of the population and were
inevitably communicated to and by the Guam Congressmen.
In the sentiments articulated in congressional
sessions, the problematic issues such as land
alienation, discrimination, and unfair government
practices were all the more disturbing in light of a
war experience so fresh and brutal.
Members of Congress shared diverse perceptions
and understandings of citizenship, but despite the
variety of arguments employed, they unanimously agreed
that citizenship was not only desirable, but necessary.
Mariano Santos: At present, the wage scale for
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the Guamanians is very low. If we have this
Organic Act and our political status changes, I am
sure a lot of things will be changed for the
better, too. At present, again, we have the Army
and the Navy here as representatives of the
President of the United States. If we should have
this Organic Act and our political status changes
we would be dealing directly with the President of
the United States and not his representatives.
Carlos Taitano: We are outside the family now.
How can we demand our rights if we do not belong?
We have not the right until we have been granted
citizenship. After you belong, then you can
demand your rights.
Frank Perez: Do we want to be forever wards of
the United States of America - we, and our
children after us? Certainly we don't want it.
The definition of a ward is a person who is
incapable, having no initiative but just to be led
by a guiding hand, telling you to face right and
left. Do you want to be in that status forever?
Do we want to be pushed around?
You have seen all of the discrimination going
on, depriving us of our rights. Do you want to
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let this thing go on for another century until we
lose everything we have? - until we having nothing
to fall back on? What will be our economic
situation in the days to come? No land, no money,
no home. Where is our security? Have we any
secure spot anywhere on these 225 square miles? I
say, no.
Antonio C. Cruz: We would like to be secure in
our homes and free from fear and condemnation of
our property. We would like the privilege and
freedom of planning our own homes ... Our land is
fast being condemned and there is little available
land for agriculture now (Guam Congress Joint
Session, December 22, 1948).
Ironically, Congress members such as Mariano
Santos believed Guam's representatives would deal
directly with the US President. Others such as Frank
Perez and Carlos Taitano assumed that discrimination
would end and civil rights would be guaranteed, and
Congress members such as Antonio Cruz believed that
land injustices would be corrected.
In their sessions prior to the walkout, both
Assembly and Council members questioned the authority
of the naval governor. In their perception, the
judicial branch of government was little more than an
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arm of the governor, and its appeal process to the
secretary of the Navy seemed improper and unfair to
Chamorros. From their experience, it was also evident
that the legislative branch lacked power; the "limited
legislative powers" granted by the 1947 proclamation
failed to provide them with a means of alleviating the
island's problems. This fundamental lack of a balanced
three-branch system of government simply became
unacceptable.
Plagued by critical land injustices,
discriminatory pay practices, and other problems
rendered unresolvable owing to insufficient judicial
and legislative leverage, Guam's Congress members
challenged the US government to live up to its
ideological rhetoric. Finally the us Congress and
administration responded, with the appointment of a
civilian governor, the termination of military rule,
and the passage of an organic act for Guam with
citizenship for the Chamorro people.
Carlos Taitano was privileged to attend the
signing of the Organic Act on 1 August 1950 in
Washington, DC, by President Truman, the Act having
passed after the failure of 29 previous House and
Senate bills and resolutions (Zenor, pp. 283-294).
Taitano vividly recalled accepting the congratulations
of those in attendance. It was a major victory won for
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the Chamorro people, he was told, especially because
the Navy desired to maintain complete control over Guam
in the light of escalating conflict in Korea. White
House staff and Department of the Interior personnel
communicated to Taitano that the Guam Congress walkout,
in an age of decolonization, was an embarrassment to
the US government and drew attention to the urgency of
Guam's situation. Taitano particularly valued the
words of those in attendance who confided in him that,
"the walkout did it" (Carlos Taitano, personal
communication, November 29, 1993).
Just as surely as the walkout was a
multidimensional episode, so surely was the Organic
Act's passage one of multifarious causes. The
influence of various Chamorro and other lobbying
efforts, the impact of national publicity and
international embarrassment, and the effect of the
Hopkins Committee report all had various influences
upon members of the Washington, DC, executive and
legislative branches. The pressures of being a world
leader in an era of decolonization, along with postwar
modifications in military operations and styles of
leadership also undoubtedly factored into the Act's
passage. But for the members of the Guam Congress and
to the people of Guam, attributing credit to anyone
force was immaterial as they began immediately the task
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of appropriating to themselves the Government of Guam.
A LEAP BACK TO THE PRESENT
Amid Guam's contemporary political struggles -- in
the battle for commonwealth status and in the quest for
Chamorro self-determination -- the aspirations and
achievements of my grandfather, si difuntun Joaquin
Cruz Perez, and his colleagues in the Guam Congress
seem especially worthy of inquiry. While our island
has changed so much, and while our people have
ostensibly achieved so much, ironically the hopes and
dreams of previous generations -- for sovereignty,
self-reliance, and freedom from land alienation --
provokingly linger.
In a 1986 interview, Governor Ricardo J. Bordallo
commented, "[i]t was a sad day for the people of Guam
when the Organic Act was signed .... The Organic Act is
not designed to enhance the dignity of the indigenous
people. It was designed to enhance the colonial
authority of the United States" (Stinson, p. 4). But
just as Governor Bordallo's father, Guam Congress
member Baltasar Bordallo, struggled long and hard to
transform Guam's political status, so too do succeeding
generations fight their battles in the struggle for
political justice. Listening to the deliberations and
emotions articulated in the 1949 Guam Congress, I am
struck by their similarity to today's political
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discourse. As we near our centennial mark as an
American colony, I wonder where we, i man Chamoru, are
as a people in our homeland, what the u.s. government




Assistant Chief of Naval Operations. (1946). Report to
United Nations on Guam, American Samoa and Other
Island Possessions Administered by the Navy
Department. Washington, DC.
Beardsley, Charles. (1964). Guam Past and Present.
Tokyo: Charles E. Tuttle.
Bordallo, Penelope. (1982). "A Campaign for Political
Rights on Guam, Mariana Islands, 1899-1950."
Unpublished manuscript submitted as partial
fulfillment of Master's Degree requirements,
University of Hawai'i.
Carano, Paul & Pedro C. Sanchez. (1964). A Complete
History of Guam. Tokyo: Charles E. Tuttle.
Collier, John. (1947). Analytical Summary of the
Hopkins Committee Report on Guam and American
Samoa. Washington, DC: Institute of Ethnic
Affairs.
"Condemnation." (August 31, 1948). Guam Echo.
Washington, DC: Institute of Ethnic Affairs.
Coulter, Doloris. (April 3, 1949). "Guam Rebels at New
Navy 'Rule.' II Washington Post, p. 3B.
"Francisco Sanchez Urges Citizenship For Guamanians. II
(August 20, 1949). Guam News, p. 2.
Griffith, Richard Roy. (1978). "From Island Colony to
Strategic Territory: The Development of American
Administration in the Island of Guam: 1898-1950."
Unpublished Dissertation, University of Denver.
"Governor Pownall Announces Retirement Here Sept. 1."
(June 4, 1949). Guam News, p. 1.
"Guam Assembly Quits: Protests What It Calls a Navy
Move to Limits its Power. II (March 6, 1949). The
New York Times, p. 52L.
Guam Congress House of Assembly. Congressional Record.
Guam Congress House of Council. Congressional Record.
"Guam's Boston Tea-Party. II (March 29, 1949). Editorial.
Honolulu Star Bulletin, p. 8.
47
.. .
Hale'-ta: I Ma Gobetna-na Guam, Governing Guam: Before
and After the Wars. (1994). Mangilao, Guam:
Political Status Education Coordinating
Commission.
Hopkins, Ernest M. (Chairman), Tobin, Maurice J., &
Ryerson, Knowles A. (1947). Report on the Civil
Governments of Guam and American Samoa by
Secretary of the Navy James's Special Civilian
Committee. Washington, DC: Navy Department.
"Housing of Guamanian People Greatest Problem Faced on
Island Following War With 1,400 Homes Provided
Them." (November 24, 1949). Guam News, p. 1.
"Land Disposition Issue Dominates Tuesday's Organic Act
Hearings; Final Session Opens 10 a.m. Today."
(November 23, 1949). Guam News, p. 1.
"Laura Thompson: A Guam Friend." (June 17, 1983).
Panorama, p. 6A.
Maga, Timothy P. (1988). Defending Paradise: The
United States and Guam 1898-1950. New York:
Garland.
"Mr. Won Pat Explains Default of Assembly in Letter to
Governor Regarding Powers of Lower House." (March
20, 1949). Guam News, p. 1.
"Navy Action Protested by Guam Assembly." (March 6,
1949). Washington Post, p. 20M.
"Navy to Buy Land." (May 29, 1948). Guam Echo.
Washington, DC: Institute of Ethnic Affairs, p. 1.
Pomeroy, Earl S. (1951). Pacific Outpost: American
Strategy in Guam and Micronesia. New York:
Russell & Russell.
Pownall, Charles A., Governor of Guam. (January 3,
1949). "Letter to the Guam Congress." Available
in Congressional Record of the Guam Congress.
Pownall, Charles A., Governor of Guam. (July 20, 1948)
"Memorandum to Guam Congress, Subject: Resolution
of Guam Congress relating to property rights in
Tumon." Available in the Pacific Collection,
Hamilton Library, University of Hawai'i at Manoa.
Pownall, Charles A., Governor of Guam. (April 26,
1948). "Memorandum to the Guam Congress, Subject:
48
Tumon Bay Area, Status of." Available in the
Pacific Collection, Hamilton Library, University




(1988). Guahan Guam: The History of
Agana, Guam: Sanchez Publishing
Stinson, Bart. (October 9, 1986). "Civilian government
was born from the Organic Act in 1950." Pacific
Daily News, p. 4.
Sullivan, John L., Acting Secretary of the Navy.
(1947). Proclamation Grantinq Limited Powers to
Guam Congress. Washington, DC.
"Taitano Brings New Image to Speakership." (1965).
Pacific Profile, p. 12.
Thompson, Laura. (1991). Beyond the Dream: A Search for
Meaning. Micronesian Area Research Center:
University of Guam.
Thompson, Laura. (1947). Guam and Its People.
Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Thompson, Laura. (1944). "Guam: Study in Military
Government." Far Eastern Survey, pp. 149-154.
Underwood, Robert Anacletus. (1987). "American
Education and the Acculturation of the Chamorros
of Guam." Unpublished Dissertation, University of
Southern California.
Underwood, Robert A. to Richard Wels. (January 31, 1977
and March 28, 1977).
Weber, Frederick A. (1970). "The Evolution of a
Representative Form of Government in Guam 1667-
1950." Unpublished manuscript submitted as
partial fulfillment of Master's Degree
requirements, University of Guam.
Wels, Richard H. to Robert A. Underwood. (March 9,
1977) .
Wheeler, Joseph, Brigadier General, U.S. Army. (1900)
Report on the Island of Guam. Wash, DC: GPO.
Zenor, Michael Dean. (1949). "United States Naval
Government and Administration of Guam."
Unpublished Dissertation, University of Iowa.
49
) 11" ...
1901 Peti tion to the Uni ted Sta tes Congress. (December
17, 1901). This petition, from the people of Guam
to the US Congress, is available in the
Congressional Record of the United States
Congress.
1933 Petition to the United States Congress. (December
19, 1933). This is a petition from the Guam
Congress to the US Congress. Available in the
Congressional Record of the United States
Congress.
50
